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MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE AND STATISTICAL
METHODS IN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY
FRANCE
by
TERENCE D. MURPHY*
INTRODUCTION
In eighteenth-century France the outstanding achievements in the physical and
natural sciences contrasted sharply with the limited advances of the medical arts. A
growing confidence in the ability to manipulate the material world only increased
frustration at the unsteady progress in medicine; the complex equilibrium between the
human organism and the milieu eluded precise scrutiny, and frequently contemporary
theory failed to guide practitioners in the successful treatment of numerous illnesses.
Confronting this difficulty, physicians reaffirmed their commitment to heal the sick
and to protect the healthy. Yet this heightened attention to traditional ends did not
silence critics who exposed the tenuous qualities of medical practice, nor did it
reassure younger practitioners who questioned the adequacy of medical knowledge.
Perhaps success in so many other areas ofhuman endeavour raised their expectations
beyond legitimate limits.
Even apart from individual reactions to particular cases, a more public and more
general problem remained. Since mid-century, philosophers had aspired to place the
study of man at the centre of their naturalistic world view, an ambition which saw
progress in medical science as an integral part of a larger, long-term project. Con-
vinced of the validity of their optimistic perspective on the future, thoughtful
physicians paused to examine the groundings of medical science, its methods, and the
degree ofcertitude appropriate to medicaljudgments. From Pierre Cabanis to Claude
Bernard, physicians undertook this re-evaluation in the context of medicine's
relationship to both the moral and physical sciences and, most importantly, against
the background of Enlightenment ideology. Human concerns, stripped of any
theological pretensions, occupied the centre ofthis new world view. The elimination of
poverty, the instauration of constitutional government, and the propagation of civil
virtue were grandiose ambitions nourished by a faith in the community's ability to
redefine social goals in national and democratic terms rather than according to the
needs of any privileged group or individual. Underlying these goals was the funda-
mental truth that perceptive and well-trained men could understand the complexity of
economic motivation and social choice, a trust founded upon the belief that a century
of progress in the rational and experimental sciences could translate into a similar
revolution in moral and civic life.
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Exactly how such a transfer was to take place perplexed reformers, but several
currents of contemporary thought provided strong motivation for the attempt.
D'Alembert's belief in the essential unity of knowledge, for example, permeated
Enlightenment writing and heightened confidence in analytical methods, so much so
that social reformers and even doctors considered their use to resolve problems of
political and medical choice. The calculus ofprobabilities, statistical analysis, or more
simple numerical methods enjoyed favour among diverse practitioners. Pinel praised
their use in evaluating the treatment of the mentally disturbed, Villerme turned to
them for an analysis of public health problems, and Louis valued their help in
therapeutics. To be sure, the dubious legacy ofearlier eighteenth-century attempts to
use quantitative methods discouraged widespread or rapid adoption of numerical
analysis. While not totally deficient, these earlier approaches, such as Pitcairne's,
were hardly fruitful or encouraging examples for his successors. More pointedly,
certain critics of numerical techniques (and they were many) affirmed the unique
nature ofthedoctor's personal intervention in the life ofan ailing patient, an act which
necessarily precluded any application ofstatistical analysis.
Writing just before the French Revolution, Cabanis first formalized the reaction to
quantitative techniques. Yet, his debt to Condillac and sensationalist psychology
demonstrated his allegiance to another tenet of Enlightenment thought, the firm
integration ofthe study of man into a secular and naturalistic world view. A first step
in this process was the interpretation of intellectual or psychic processes in material
terms or, put differently, the affirmation ofa link between consciousness and material
existence. This reversal of the Cartesian formula allowed Cabanis to dramatize the
quality of the doctor-patient relationship and de-emphasize quantitative methods
which might neutralize the personal nature ofthe medical act. Again, his attachment
to thespecific nature ofmedical practice ruled out any formal alliance with the natural
sciences and justified claims for a criterion of medical knowledge independent of any
formal standards established in other fields ofhuman enquiry. Cabanis's younger con-
temporary, Xavier Bichat, shared this reluctance to transfer quantitative methods, so
useful for the study of the physical universe, into the domain of the living and the
dying. Earlier, Diderot had deflated contemporary enthusiasm for mechanical or
mathematical models when he explored the implications ofthe temporal dimension of
the organic order, and later, more systematically, Claude Bernard would finally for-
mulate the theoretical bases for experimental medicine which respected the unique
character oforganic phenomena without renouncing for medicine the determinism he
admired so much in the physical sciences. In fact, his passionate appeal for a strict
determinism forced him to de-emphasize statistical methods, for he firmly believed
that as long as medicine relied on such tools it would remain a conjectural science.
Reluctant to linger with ambiguity, Bernard shunned the probabilistic quality of
statistical statements and urged physicians and physiologists to identify precise causes
for specific effects. Laplace, his mentor and inspiration, had led the way in this search
for a rigorous determinism in the physical sciences. A half-century later Bernard
exhibited that same passion for exactitude, but strangely enough he ignored Laplace's
own considerable attention to problems which required the calculus ofprobabilities, a
method ofconjecture yielding only probability statements on the matter under study.
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In fact, the popularity ofthe calculus ofprobabilities, as much a consequence ofCon-
dorcet's efforts to apply it to civic questions as of Laplace's own work, had positive
effects on the medical community where physicians speculated on its utility for
estimating the veracity ofmedicaljudgments.
Condemned by some, praised by others, and misunderstood by many, the calculus
of probabilities and, more generally, the application of quantitative methods in
medicine had a stormy history in the first half of the nineteenth century. Examining
the arguments of advocates and opponents of numerical methods will offer a better
understanding of the profession's response to specific aspects of Enlightenment
thought and also clarify the process by which medicine was adapted to a secular and
scientific age.'
STATISTICS AND THE CALCULUS OF PROBABILITIES: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the analysis of statistical data
received the attention of administrators, political economists, public health officers,
and finally physicians. Reminiscent of de Witte's, Petty's, and Bacon's appeal for a
natural history ofman, vital statistics assisted leaders in their estimation ofthe state's
strengths and weaknesses. Founded with this end in mind, the Societe Royale de
Medecine (1776) had gathered information for a medical topography ofthe kingdom,
a necessary first step in evaluating the effect of seasonal or climatic changes on the
well-being of rural France. Later, in 1800, the Bureau de Statistiques was an ill-fated
attempt at a more systematic study of the realm's human and material resources.
Although short-lived, both initiatives indicated the growing interest in obtaining a
more precise, less impressionistic picture ofnational life. In 1817 Chabrol, the Prefect
of Paris, ordered the regular publication of statistics, which admirably fulfilled the
administrator's desire for reliable information on birth and mortality rates, the move-
ment of grains, meats, and other foods. In the same spirit public health boards and
individual physicians, such as Louis Villerme or Parent-Duchatelet, systematized the
collection of public health records and data on occupational illnesses or mortality.
These studies flourished in the 1820s and 1830s, extending into the domain ofepidemi-
ology and eventually creating what came to be known as moral statistics. Taken
together they provide a portrait of France adjusting to the burdens of urbanization
and early industrialization. Often the doctor eloquently defended the victims of
modernization, by evoking, statistics in hand, the inequality of the rich and the poor
before death. Active also in the countryside, as Balzac's realistic characterization
11 am grateful to reviewers for their helpful editorial and bibliographical suggestions. See Erwin H.
Ackerknecht, Medicine in the Paris hospital, 1794-1848, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, 1967; and
Edouard-Rudolf Mullener, 'Zur methodischen therapeutisch-klinischen Forschung der "Ecole de Paris"
(1800-1850)', Gesnerus, 1966, 23: 122-131.
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empirical social research, Brighton, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1975; lan Hacking, The emergence of
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suggests, the physician frequently embodied the secular and humanitarian spirit of
Enlightenment France. This sentiment reached its climax in 1848 when concerned
physicians called for the instauration of social medicine, an attempt to convert the
doctor and the profession into the advocate and defender of the labouring classes
before the civil authorities. These concrete gestures carried into practice an essential
Enlightenment theme: science as public knowledge would be a force for reform and
renovation. Put differently, reformers believed that open discussion of relevant infor-
mation could move men to correct social injustices and further material progress.
A related development in mathematics would also influence doctors seeking an
objective measure ofconfidence in medicaljudgments. Aside from public discussion of
pertinent information, a second cause animated eighteenth-century reformers. In
rejecting the arbitrary exercise of personal powers, so characteristic of the ancien
regime, they called for rational action in a democratic society. Their problem, of
course, was to fix onjust or rational objectives at a time when passion and pride con-
ditioned political choice. Above all, they had to suggest how it was possible to arrive
at wise decisions when competing interests and personal loyalties conditioned deci-
sions made through democratic processes. In other words, the reformers had to
demonstrate that a just society could emerge from the decisions of the majority. In
Ars conjectandi (1713) Jacob Bernouilli had suggested a way out of the dilemma:
perfect the calculus ofprobabilities to a point where errors in humanjudgment could
be estimated with a high degree of precision. An astute mathematician could then
develop the rules for evaluating human judgment and thus offer the possibility of
rational organization in the political domain. This early suggestion for a science of
decision-making influenced Condorcet, who eventually took the bold, perhaps
impetuous step towards applying the calculus of probabilities to social and political
life. It was this initiative which subsequently inspired physicians to wonder about its
applications to medical judgments. In his Essay on the application ofmathematics to
the theory ofdecision making (1785), Condorcet's most sophisticated mathematical
undertaking, he attempted to set down the rules for calculating the plurality necessary
to assure the veracity of decisions affecting a variety of civic values and matters of
criminal justice. Formerly, probability theory had proven its worth in estimating life
annuities or rates of maritime insurance. Now, Condorcet argued, calculation could
also serve in an entirely different domain, the operations ofthe human mind, "where it
weighs the grounds for belief and calculates the probable truth of testimony or
decisions".2 Contemporary events, controlled by passion and factionalism, proved the
need for such a guide. Though never completed, Condorcet's social mathematics
remained a part ofhis legacy to social theorists and, as we shall see, influenced a sig-
nificant portion ofthe medical profession.
In 1795, just a year after Condorcet's death, Pierre-Simon de Laplace, one of the
founding fathers of probability theory and the foremost physicist ofhis day, delivered
a series of lectures at the Ecole Normale. In the tenth and final presentation Laplace
2 Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, 'A general view of the science of social
mathematics (1793)', in Keith M. Baker (editor), Condorcet: selected writings, Indianapolis, Bobbs
Merrill, 1976, p. 186. See K. M. Baker, Condorcet: Jrom natural philosophy to social mathematics,
Chicago and London, University ofChicago Press, 1975, pp. 330-342.
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chose to discuss the calculus ofprobabilities, a lecture which later served as the basis
ofhis well-known Essaisphilosophiques surlesprobabilite's. To understand the larger
context of the subsequent debate over mathematical methods in medical science, it is
necessary to pay close attention to Laplace's argument.
In his lecture Laplace described how the calculus ofprobabilities had originated as
a response to problems posed in games of chance. He then proceeded to trace its
gradual extension to the physical and moral sciences. Here Laplace reaffirmed Con-
dorcet's optimism, demonstrating that the slow progress to master the physical and
moral sciences derived only from human ignorance of the causes of events and not
from the nature of the subject studied. The knowledge of causes, then, was the pre-
eminent problem. Contemporary developments had shown that it was possible to
reason from the frequency ofevents to the probability oftheir causes. In other words,
the repeated experience ofa set ofrelations could lead to conclusions about their con-
stancy and regularity. Laplace pointed out that this method was extremely useful for
seeking out the fixed relations in seemingly variable events. With this aid, for example,
mathematicians could calculate the probability of birth rates or mortality rates from
statistical data. But Laplace expressed reservations about the utility of applying
mathematics to decisions taken by an assembly. The fundamental drawback of such
procedures, he remarked, lies in the inescapable fact that varying degrees of
intelligence and disinterestedness characterize the members of an assembly. As long
as passion and self-interest affect a representative's vote, it is useless to seek out the
probable truth ofdecisions through the use ofthe calculus. In fact, the more vital the
issue, the more likely are vested interests to counter the voice of reason. Yet his
scepticism about current possibilities did not rule out hope for the future use of the
calculus.
Before men could take such a step, Laplace argued in the conclusion ofhis presenta-
tion, it was extremely important that all people be educated. Yet even this was not
enough. To secure the play of reason on civic life, Laplace willingly took a step back
from Condorcet's democratic ideals when he insisted that only an elite ofjust and
enlightened men should act as national representatives. Reminiscent of Plato's
philosopher ruler, Laplace's representative would assure the administration ofjustice
and safeguard the state from illusions thrown up by popular passion or prejudice.
Ideals would also guide his decisions: "Truth, justice, humanity, these are the eternal
laws of the social order which must rest solely on the true relations between men and
on man's relation to nature; they are as necessary to man as the law of universal
gravity is to the physical order."3 But unlike the Platonic sage, Laplace's lawmaker
admitted he had never penetrated beyond the world of shadows. Consequently con-
tingency and uncertainty continued to mar human progress towards the ideals oftruth
andjustice. In spite ofthe difficulties, Laplace recommended a way out: The observa-
tion and analysis ofthe facts ofpolitical economy would provide better insight into the
operations ofthe social order, revealing its injustices and flaws. Above all, lawmakers
had to avoid any adherence to traditional assumptions and practices, for only if men
3Pierre-Simon de Laplace, Exposition dusysteme du monde, Paris, J. B. M. Duprat, an VI1, p. 351.
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scrutinized economic relations as they had the physical world could human affairs
take on a semblance oforder.
If Laplace gave only qualified approval to Condorcet's initiatives to apply the
calculus to the decisions taken by a plurality of votes, he was more enthusiatic about
another project: the estimation of the plurality necessary for condemnation in
criminal trials. In fact, among all the political projects which later occupied Laplace
this particular one concerned him the most. In analysing it he had no difficulty in
seconding Condorcet's efforts. The reason for his enthusiasm is perhaps the distinc-
tion separating the matter before the jury from the problem confronting the
legislators. Whereas a lawmaking assembly often had to chart a course for future
public action, thejury evaluated the facts ofa past event. In other words, the legislator
frequently intervened to correct abuses or reorient policy towards more appropriate
social goals. This endeavour obviously involved a large degree of doubt as did any
attempt to create the conditions for a healthy and just political environment. Jurors,
on the contrary, were not concerned with what laws should govern the public realm,
but only with the supposed infraction ofexisting laws. Theirjudgment, then, bore only
on matters offact and not on social values.
After Laplace's forceful demonstration, the utility of the calculus of probabilities
for the physical sciences was beyond question. Could a similar application resolve out-
standing medical problems? From within the profession a few, but influential voices
responded affirmatively. Charles-Louis Dumas, director of the Montpellier medical
school, stands among the most prominent supporters of this new but untried
methodology. "The analysis of combinations", he wrote, "has already been applied
with success to different aspects of the physical and moral knowledge of man. If the
same method is used for other subjects, it is possible that one day physiological and
medical questions will be illuminated to such a high degree that most men will
acknowledge the results as they do the demonstrative truths of the most exact
sciences".4 This declaration of faith testified to the ardent desire to measure medical
science against the same epistemological standards measuring degrees of truth and
error in the physical sciences. Not all physicians, however, subscribed to this thesis.
Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, a member of the last generation of philosophers
known as the ideologues, hesitated to adopt the epistemological standards of the
physical sciences for medical matters. In Degre' de certitude de medecine (1788), a
treatise writtenjust before the Revolution, Cabanis defended the medical arts against
sceptics. In the context of the Enlightenment's admiration for rational and experi-
mental science, several critics objected to the less rigorous epistemological standards
of medicine. In a nuanced response, Cabanis took the offensive, accusing the
detractors ofthe art ofhaving a narrow and incorrect view ofmedical knowledge. Pre-
judicing the issue, he added that these critics were probably mere theoreticians or
incompetent practitioners. "The latter, seeing that their medicine does not succeed
and feeling that it is vague and without any basis, refuse to believe that a genuine
medical science can exist whose rules would be well-founded and whose practice truly
4Charles-Louis Dumas, Discours sur lesprogresfuturs de la science de I'homme, Montpellier, Tournel,
an XiI, p. 29.
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useful." Furthermore, the search after useful knowledge need not follow the path
opened by mathematics. In medicine, Cabanis continued, such precision is
unwarranted. Only a "plausible certitude" is required in the choice of remedies. A
more exacting standard, while suitable to the speculative demands ofthe spirit, would
immobilize men rather than aid them in the daily tasks of practical life. Cabanis
justified this transposition of medicine on to a plane with the contingent truths of
temporal existence by arguing that "each science has its own kind of proofs", a for-
mulation that ran counter to Cartesian aspirations but which echoed more realistic
appraisals ofcurrent possibilities. In this position hejoined forces with Condorcet and
Laplace, who had suggested that the moral or human sciences, like the other sciences
of observation, could offer a "high degree of probability" for their conclusions and
thus serve as guides to action in cases of practical necessity.5 Cabanis, however,
refrained from suggesting that any particular method ofcalculation be applied to the
medical sciences. Instead he asserted that specific epistemological limits circum-
scribed the field ofmedical knowledge,just as they defined the boundaries ofthe social
sciences. Going beyond Condorcet's cautious and exacting method for evaluating a
particular course ofaction, Cabanis located the seat ofmedical judgment "in a happy
instinct . . .", "in the sensation ofthe artist".6 In a word, the observer and practitioner
acquired through experience an ability to weigh correctly the consequences of
remedies on the course ofan illness. This non-quantifiable talent, a kind ofsympathie
morale, allowed the doctor to identify with his patient, to read the signs of sickness
and suggest a way to modify their effects. This highly personalized, almost intuitive
approach to medical practice was firmly grounded on Condillac's sensationalist psy-
chology and, at the same time, claimed to occupy the same epistemological ground as
Condorcet's probabilist science of man, While the application of these themes to
medicine clearly attached Cabanis to the Enlightenment tradition, a contemporary,
Philippe Pinel, had a different understanding ofthis heritage.7
A distinguished humanitarian and untiring scholar, Pinel has earned praise for his
work in Parisian asylums as well as for his attempt to classify diseases. His advocacy
of institutional reforms links him to predecessors who favoured improved medical
attention for marginal groups in French society. Such a course of action, reformers
acknowledged, was incumbent on an enlightened nation now responsible for its
citizens. And his efforts to organize the many characteristics of illness placed him
among those naturalists, like Linnaeus or Lavoisier, who had carried out systematic
classifications in other domains. These endeavours derived from a Baconian passion
to know and to order nature after some comprehensible pattern useful to men. To
these themes ofthe Enlightenment, Pinel added yet another concern, the evaluation of
medicaljudgments by an objective standard. Here again the example ofother sciences
moved Pinel to implement a more rigorous standard for the validity of medical
Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, 'Du degre de certitude de la medecine', Oeuvres philosophiques de
Cabanis, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1956, 2 vols., vol. 1, p. 90, and 'Rapports du physique et
du moral', ibid., vol. 1, p. 110, note 1.
6 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 91..See also Martin Staum, Cabanis. Enlightenment and medical philosophy in the
French Revolution, Princeton University Press, 1980.
7 Mullener, op. cit., note I above, p. 122.
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practice. Experimental evidence, the hallmark of scientific knowledge, had to have
greater force in medical conclusions. Unfortunately, rivals claimed success by citing
examples favourable to their cause, but for an "experiment to carry weight and to
serve as a solid basis for treating [the ill], it has to be made on a large number of
patients . . .".8 To strengthen his argument, Pinel, like Cabanis before him, turned to
the probability theory and its utility for testing the accuracy of conclusions. "It is
enough to say that it [experimental medicine] must be founded on the theory of
probabilities already so successfully applied to several aspects of civil life, and if the
methods for treating the sick are to have a solid foundation, they must henceforth rely
on the theory of probabilities".9 The reason for such insistence is found in the slow
progress ofthe therapeutic arts which, until now, "contain only vague precepts whose
application is perhaps more difficult and more uncertain than a total lack of
knowledge". Repeated observation of the sick, regular recording of findings, com-
parison of data over time - these habits alone could form the basis of a sound
therapeutics. Slowly Pinel's recommendations, already adopted by some colleagues,
became accepted practice in hospitals and taken as a whole came to be known as
clinical medicine.
In sum, Pinel saw two sides to medical science. The first, represented in his own
systematic nosography of diseases, was a natural history or complete description of
sicknesses. The second, related to evaluating a course of medical intervention, was
embodied in therapeutics. The former, he declared, "is already well-advanced...
taking as its guide the path followed in all the other branches of natural history". The
latter still struggled against a "blind empiricism which prevents medicine from acquir-
ing the character of a true science, an achievement it will only attain through the
application of the calculus of probabilities".10 Note that Pinel's reference to the
calculus was a loose, non-mathematical illusion. Practical limitations, such as a wide
dissimilarity of case histories, restricted the application of quantitative evaluations
and diminished their significance. Moreover, clinical medicine never fully adopted the
rigorous standards of statistical testing as required by the calculus. Instead
practitioners like Pinel had to content themselves with comparing the limited number
of cases at their disposal and arriving at ajudgment, based on simple proportions, as
to the success or failure of a particular therapy. What should be underscored,
however, is the firm conviction that therapeutics and medicine in general could only
claim to share in the contemporary understanding ofscience iftheir conclusions rested
on firmer ground than the physician's intuition. In a word, physicians did find it
important to measure medicine against the epistemological standards of the other
sciences. But ifthe comparison proved momentarily embarrassing, they believed that
developments in the social sciences, specifically Condorcet's social mathematics,
offered a model ofscientific truth appropriate to medical problems.
Medical journals and dictionaries reinforced these forthright statements on the role
Philippe Pinel, 'Resultats d'observations et construction des tables pour servir a determiner le degre de
probabilite de la guerison des alienes (9 f6vrier 1807)', Memoires de la classedes sciences mathematiques et
physiques del'institut nationalde France, 1807, 8: 169.
9Ibid., p. 170.
10 Ibid.
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of mathematics in medicine. In the introduction to the Dictionnaire des sciences
medicales, Etienne Pariset wrote: "Having examined the patient and noted the various
symptoms the results lead the doctor by a calculus ofprobabilities, or rather by a very
refined sentiment and by a sort ofinstinct superior to reason, to an appropriate choice
of remedies and a well regulated method oftreatment".1' When Laplace reconsidered
this issue in 1814, he was more precise. Although he wrote that "the theory of
probabilities is fundamentally only good sense reduced to calculation", he carefully
submitted intuitive judgments to the rigours of analysis, something lacking in
Pariset's comment.'2 This was necessary because knowledge oftherapeutic agents and
their effects was extremely limited. Even then a crucial question remained: how many
observations were necessary to demonstrate the superiority ofone agent over another?
"It is here that the role ofthe calculus ofprobabilities becomes indispensable".'3 And
with specific attention to therapeutics, Laplace wrote: "The calculus of probabilities
can make us appreciate the advantages and inconveniences of the methods employed
in the conjectural sciences. Thus, in order to recognize the best treatment in healing an
illness it suffices to try each ofthem on the same number ofpatients while keeping all
the circumstances perfectly alike. The superiority ofthe most advantageous treatment
will be manifested more and more as the number ofcases increases; and the calculus
will make known the probability corresponding to its [the treatment's] advantage".'4
In this passage Laplace set down two requirements. First, the doctor had to have a
sufficient number ofcases tojudge the beneficial effects ofvarious treatments. Deter-
mining that number was, for the moment, beyond the doctor's competence, and
Laplace himselfnever directly applied the calculus to medical phenomena. The second
requirement, a constant relation between observed effects, imposed demands that
would trouble physicians. While all contemporaries agreed that observation and com-
plete description was the basis of a sound therapeutics, it remained an open question
whether numerical methods could actually influence the choice of a remedy in a
particular case. Frequent failures had tempered physicians' enthusiasm for new solu-
tions to persistent problems, and not all saw the imposition of numerical standards as
the answer to their difficulties. Auguste-Charles Savary, a contributor to the
Dictionnaire des sciences medicales, sounded a note of caution. He admitted, of
course, that past experience conditioned presentjudgments and, hence, that analogical
reasoning provided the basis for all prognostics. But he warned doctors against assum-
ing any identity between individual cases, something possible in mathematics but
unattainable in medicine: "Analogy in medicine is never as perfect as it is in the
mathematical sciences. In effect in mathematics there is an equality of relations,
whereas in medicine there is only similarity, resemblance, approximation. Accord-
ingly, analogy, and other influences effecting the character ofa disease must be taken
into account".'"
11 Etienne Pariset, 'Prospectus', Dictionnaire des sciences medicales, Paris, Panckoucke, 1812-1822, 58
vols., vol. 1, p. vii.
12 Pierre-Simon de Laplace, Essaisphilosophiquessurlesprobabilites, Paris, Courcier, 1814, p. 95.
13 Ibid., p. 50.
4 Ibid., p. 51.
" Auguste-Charles Savary, 'Analogie', Dictionnaire des sciences medicales, op. cit., note I I above,
vol. 2, p. 18.
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THE NUMERICAL METHOD: ADVOCATES AND CRITICS
The preoccupation with individual differences troubled physicians, who believed
that the absence of demonstrable principles deprived medicine of a permanent base
and gave them free reign in the selection and administration ofremedies. In the 1820s,
Louis, Chomel, and others waged an ardent campaign to win acceptance of a
numerical method for evaluating the worth of particular treatments. They had
numerous obstacles to overcome and in the end they could not convert the profession
to their way ofthinking. Colleagues' reluctance to accept their point of view was not,
however, a rejection of empirical standards: on the contrary, many practitioners felt
that the kind of generalization required by the new method was itself a flight from
objectivity. Louis argued against this point of view which gave pre-eminence to the
individual case. He insisted that physicians "could gather together similar facts in
order to enunciate laws which experience constantly verifies.... Experience also
shows... that the same medication administered to individuals differing in age,
strength, temperament, etc.... could have a nearly constant success".'6 Fortified with
these principles, Louis concluded that "facts need not have a perfect resemblance in
order to be grouped". Similarly, "when the action of a therapeutic agent is very
efficacious it seems to efface numerous differences and to act directly on the disease
itself'.'7 This was a reasonable argument that merited attention. But Louis used this
methodological argument to challenge the therapeutic value ofbleeding, a traditional
remedy popularized by Broussais, a noted physician of the Val-de-Grace. The issue
was joined when Louis used the numerical method, which was no more than a
proportional statement of success or failure out of the total treated, to suggest that
repeated purgations cured more patients than any other remedy, particularly
Broussais's.
Opposition to Louis came from two groups. First, those who disagreed with his
methodology could argue that this procedure emulated the experimental sciences but
lacked their rigour. Others simply saw no firm evidence, numerical or otherwise, for
abandoning a particular remedy in favour of another. Here Louis was on weak
ground, for by his own count many patients failed to benefit from his treatment. More
importantly, he had not devised a test for significance which would indicate con-
clusively success or failure in the competition between rival treatments. For some
physicians the very admission that patients succumbed to a particular therapy showed
that Louis's margin of error was still too large. In a word, no decisive evidence
appeared to convince physicians ofthe value ofa particular remedy. In fact, there was
considerable ambiguity concerning the very nature of such evidence. Despite the
opposition, a persuasive group argued that medicine should follow the lead of the
moral and physical sciences in adopting numerical or statistical methods, for these
techniques had come to represent the forward edge of social and scientific improve-
ment. A partisan of this point ofview stated the case clearly: "Statistics have been of
16 Pierre-Charles-Alexandre Louis, Recherches sur les effets de lasaignhe dansquelques maladies inflam-
matoires et sur l'action de l'emetique et des visicatoires dans la pneumonie, Paris, J. B. Bailliere, 1835,
pp. 72-73.
7 Ibid., p. 74.
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immense utility, powerfully serve the cause ofprogress, give a new impetus to political
economy and impose on public hygiene a totally new character of exactitude and
rigour. Is it possible that statistics should stop precisely on the threshold ofmedicine?
that it be applicable to the duration oflife, but not to the sick; that it serve to calculate
the chances oflife and death ofthe population in all social conditions, but be unable to
calculate the chances of life and death of the population of hospitals?"'8 Less
rhetorical but more to the point were the questions: "But what are the limits to the
applications of the calculus in pathology and therapeutics, and what degree of con-
fidence can we accord to the results that it gives?"'9
During the 1830s a vigorous exchange between these rival points of view animated
the medical profession when the Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Medicine
debated the role of probability theory in the medical sciences. The nature of medical
knowledge remained at the centre of these discussions as participants reflected on the
proper epistemological boundaries of their science. An unusual aspect of these
proceedings appears in Simon-Denis Poisson's initial rejection of the application of
the calculus of probabilities to problems of medical choice. Later he was to reverse
this stance and side with those favouring such a usage. Another important feature of
this debate touched on the social role of the doctor, which several believed would be
severely modified should the calculus affect medical judgment. From these heated
exchanges also came the clarification ofthe two aspects of medical statistics, the first
pertaining to medical topography or public health questions and the other related to
therapeutics. If many doctors viewed this latter usage with suspicion, there was
general approval for statistical studies ofpopulations. Persuaded to accept the conclu-
sions ofstatistical analysis for matters related to public health, doctors would not give
their assent to mathematical guidelines where the individual patient was concerned. A
strong humanist tradition which honoured personality and uniqueness partially
explains this reluctance to submit the sick to a statistical order. A desire to protect the
profession and strengthen its feeble hold on society could also have directed those
hostile to an inversion ofthe decision-making process in therapeutics.
Medical statistics, willingly provided by certain doctors, already gave civil
authorities the powerful tool to regulate matters of public behaviour affecting the
community's health. In other words the doctor's knowledge and skill made him the
perfect collaborator ready to assist public officials' attempts to regulate disorder. In
fact, the public health movement, built on medical statistics, increased the political
power acquired by the medical profession as the progress of industrialization
necessitated their intervention to criticize or justify changes in the organization of
social life. But co-operation with authorities was not the sole explanation for the
profession's increasing share of local power, for the prestige accorded to the talented
doctor also enhanced the socio-political position of the group. Primarily acquired
through private practice and not public function, this esteem derived from the ability
to discern and treat the illnesses ofthe sick. To mitigate the importance ofthe doctor's
"S Casimir Broussais, De la statistique appliquee a la pathologie et i laltherapeutique, Paris, Bailliere,
1840, pp. 14-15.
19 Ibid., p. 14.
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insight into the causes of disorders might disenchant the patient and reduce the
medical act to a mere mechanical intervention. In the 1830s these and other issues
came under scrutiny during the debates on the efficacy ofmedical statistics.
THE DEBATE: THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE ACADEMY OF MEDICINE
In the Academy of Sciences the debate began when Francois Double, recently
elected to the section of medicine and surgery, issued the report on the merits of
Civiale's Recherches statistiques.... Poisson, the renowned mathematician and
member ofthe commission, concurrently was developing his law oflarge numbers, an
extension of Condorcet's and Laplace's work on probability theory. When the com-
mission's report appeared on 5 October 1835, it disapproved ofany application ofthe
calculus to medical problems. No evidence is available to indicate that Poisson chose
at that time to disagree with Double, the commission's reporter. This omission later
encouraged members ofthe Academy of Medicine to claim that Poisson opposed the
application of probability theory to therapeutics. During the debate, Poisson would
clarify the positiori which was fully developed in his Recherches surlaprobabilite des
jugementsprincipalement en matierecriminelle, which was finally published in 1837.20
Double's principal objection to statistical analysis came from the suppression of
individual differences required by the method: "In statistical matters . . . the first care
before all else is to ignore that a man is anisolated individual and only to consider him
as a fraction ofthe species. It is necessary to strip him ofhis individuality in order to
eliminate any accidental qualities from the question. In applied medicine, on the con-
trary, the problem is always individual, the facts only presenting themselves one at a
time .., and finally it is only a single man with all his idiosyncracies that the doctor
must treat. The masses remain completely out of the question".2' Double also noted
that the calculus of probabilities calls for "an unlimited number of facts....
Everything is different in the medical order; the facts are too few to enter into the
domain of the calculus of probabilities".22 Obviously Double was correct in asserting
that large numbers were indispensable to formulate correctjudgments. The next ques-
tion, unasked by Double, was how large they had to be. In concluding, he refused any
concession to the numerists or sceptics who challenged medical truth. Did medical
knowledge suffer from a lack of certitude because it was unable to meet the rigorous
demands of the calculus? Here Double insisted on the validity of Morgagni's maxim:
Non numerandae sedperpendendae observationes (it is not necessary to count, but it
is necessary to weigh the facts). The calculus, not permitting this kind of selection,
was inapplicable to medicine. This tentative judgment did not satisfy the advocates
of statistical methods, and soon thereafter they would have an opportunity to
defend their views before the Academy ofMedicine.
A report on the treatment of typhoid by purgation precipitated this debate. Louis,
Andral, and Bouillaud, all defenders of the numerical method, participated in the
20 1 am grateful to Pere Constabel ofthe Centre Alexandre Koyre for his advice on Poisson's development
during this period.
21 C. r. hebd. Seanc. Acad. Sci., Paris, 21 September 1835, 1: 173.
22 Ibid., p. 174.
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commission which evaluated this study purporting to demonstrate the superiority of
repeated purgations over bleeding in the treatment oftyphoid fever. This challenge to
popular practice had a rather unsettling effect on the Academy, especially as it relied
on quantitative comparisons as evidence for its claims. The commission, sensitive to
the feeling of the prominent defenders of bleeding as a treatment, cautioned against
undue speculation and recommended the continued evaluation of the new remedy:
"Before this treatment can be adopted as the best in all cases, ... it is necessary to
follow these observations over several years and in several different countries".23 Only
then could this result be transformed into a law oftherapeutics. Premature application
ofthe numerical method distorts the results, but properly applied it serves as the final
judge. Some members did not share the commission's enthusiasm and asked the
Academy to enquire into the utility ofstatistics in its application to medicine.
A month later, in April 1837, the debate opened when Risueno d'Amador, already
well known for his work in pathological anatomy, discussed the application of
mathematics to medicine.24 An informed but unkind observer characterized the
ensuing debate in this way: "At a time when the confused noise ofa thousand opposed
voices reigned in the medical world, you could only be heard by speaking a little bit
louder. At a time when so many opposing parties vied for the empire of science, you
could not win adherents without exciting them'.25 The medical press, delighted by
Risueno d'Amador's flamboyant oratory as much as his unbridled attack on the
supporters of the calculus, reported the presentation and covered the subsequent
debate which lasted three months, from April to July 1837.
In his opening discourse Risueno d'Amador held that medicine enjoyed a privileged
place among the arts and sciences. Alternately relying on the deductive method or
analogous reasoning to define medical enquiry, he paraded medicine under the banner
of science, claiming that such methods led to truths appropriate to the subject.
Viewing medicine as an art, he noted that in the final stage of the medical act the
independent judgment of the doctor-artist intervened to bridge the gap between these
scientific conclusions and the choice oftreatment. This last step was accomplished by
the intuitive genius, a special instinct which only the well-trained and gifted doctor
possessed. Understood in its two-fold nature, the defence of medicine against the
calculus, became a struggle against the intrusion of abject scepticism and blind
routine. Risueno d'Amador argued that in offering only probable truths the calculus
abandoned science to doubt. The Academy's acceptance ofsuch conclusions indicated
that the results of the debate carried on throughout the scientific revolution on the
nature of scientific knowledge had never penetrated the medical community, or at,
least were not perceived as applicable to medicine. In brief, that previous debate had
declared the Cartesian formula and method for scientific discovery inappropriate to
23 Bull. Acad. Med., Paris, 14 March 1837, 1: 498.
24 Benigno Juan Isidor Risueno d'Amador was born on 13 February 1802 in Cartagena, Spain. He was
educated at Montpellier and reinterpreted certain themes ofvitalism for a nineteenth-century audience. See
Adolph C. P. Callisen, Medicinisches Schrifisteller-Lexicon derjetzt lebenden Aerzte, Wundiirzte
Copenhagen, beim Verfasser, 1830-1845, 33 vols., vol. 16, p. 145, and vol. 31, p. 471.
25Jean-Baptiste Bouillaud, Essaisur laphilosophie medicale et sur lesgeneralites de la clinique medicale,
Paris, Bailliere, 1837, p. xi.
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the world outside the realm ofclear and distinct ideas. Probability statements were the
best and only alternative to scepticism. This admission, while taking a more modest
epistemological position, had established the basis for the calculus as a scientific tool.
Risueno d'Amador disagreed, maintaining that the calculus substituted "a uniform,
blind and mechanical routine for the action of the spirit and individual genius of the
artist". Unsuited to the twin nature of medicine, the calculus also posed moral.
problems: "Your starting-point forbids any application ofthis research to individuals,
for the problem ofthe numerist is not to heal a particular patient, but to heal the most
possible on a determined number. This problem is essentially anti-medical".6 In con-
cluding Risueno d'Amador generalized his critique ofthe calculus. Not only did such
a tool fail to serve medical science, it could not guide decisions in any of the moral
sciences, where choice "was the result of a spontaneous, instinctive conviction". He
compared this movement of the mind to the moral determination of a jury "formed
much more by the real value ofwitnesses than by their number".27
Poisson worked steadily during that year to disprove just such assertions. A little
more than a month after thedebate, he published his Recherchessurlaprobabilite des
jugements en matiere criminelle et en matiere civile. In several places he referred to
the errors and distortions of recent discussions evaluating the use of the calculus.
First, he noted that Laplace's ideas "have been misinterpreted; and people have too
hastily concluded that mathematical analysis is not applicable to this kind ofquestilon
[criminaljudgment], norgenerally to subjects that one calls morals. This is a prejudice
that I have unfortunately seen shared by good minds, and in order to destroy it, I
believe it is useful to recall a few general considerations...".28 Most specifically
Poisson asserted that probability theory could be used in therapeutics and went on to
demonstrate its range and limitations: "In applying, for example, this general
proposition to therapeutics, the corollary, which is moreover conformable to simple
good sense, is that if a medication has been successfully employed in a very large
number of similar cases, and the number of cases where it has not succeeded is very
small compared to the total number of cases of this experiment, it is very probable
that the medication will succeed in a new trial".29
In this particular debate, however, a supposedly objective method had led to
opposite conclusions. What then is the worth of the method? Later, an astute com-
mentator would respond that any purely numerical method could easily fall victim to
the predispositions of an observer, an occurrence not unknown in the history of
science. "There is one indispensable condition for the validity ofstatistical results and
that is the morality of the observer, his good faith, his intelligence. Good faith is
necessary for facts have been invented or falsified in the past. And intelligence is
required, for not every man has the quality to affirm the value of a fact."
Unfortunately, there are far too many physicians who must be asked: "What right
have you to see? What right have you to believe what you have seen? Who told you
26 Bull. Acad. Med., Paris, 1836, 1: 635.
27 Ibid., p. 668.
28 Simon-Denis Poisson, Recherches sur lesprobabilitesdesjugements en matierecivile, Paris, Bachelier,
1837, p.7.
2' Ibid., pp. v-vi, note 1.
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that you have seen?"30 These are blunt but important questions which reveal a
sensitivity to a perennial problem in the history of discovery: that fact has a way of
mingling with the predispositions ofthe observer. In an age when medical science had
only a rudimentary understanding of the nature of disease, it is not surprising that
men adhered, often desperately, to theories or practices, however unsettling the
results. At least their doctrines gave coherence to their world and guided medical
discussion and research as it entered a moreempirical age.
Even ifthe majority ofdoctors objected to the numerical methods, they recognized
the advantages ofstatistical considerations in the area of public health. Louis Castel,
Louis's opponent, thought the time appropriate for distinguishing between medical
statistics and the numerical method: "Called in turn medical statistics and numerical
method, we have been given by this procedure two faces, as a fantastic being of
mythology and have been shown at first one face and then the other. I would not
dispute the place ofstatistics in medicine. It measures the influence of place, climate,
the seasons, age, temperament, previous sicknesses, professional activity on the
patients".3" This kind of approbation did not extend to the numerical method which
Castel judged an arid calculation precisely because it often was not based on discrete
or significant data. The central focus ofthis debate for Castel concerned the collection
and evaluation of information gathered by doctors. The lack of homogeneity, an
evident failing in Louis's data, called into question his conclusions, whereas the infor-
mation gathered by the public health services or administration was a large enough
sample ofsimilar facts to proceed to an accurate correlation between environment and
health.
Even Castel's distinction between the two methods and support for medical
statistics in matters ofpublic health was not accepted by Risueno d'Amador. For him
a fundamental law required a fixed equilibrium between births and deaths, between
the healthy and the sick. Human efforts notwithstanding, nature's balance would con-
tinue to rule over government planning or the solicitude of those who argued that
clean cities and safe industries would preserve large numbers from early death. Taking
an example of human intervention in nature's course, he questioned the effectiveness
of vaccination, long proclaimed as the solution to smallpox, saying that it had not
actually lowered the national mortality rate. At the time this was a questionable and
unprovable conclusion but one shared by many of his colleagues who believed, as he,
"that death had need of nourishment; she goes elsewhere to find it when doors are
closed on one side". Pushing his generalization Risueno d'Amador continued:
"Nobody would doubt that vaccine saves the lives of certain individuals, healing
according to individual signs; but never and in no instance can a doctor judge the
utility of his art by the results of large numbers. Nature preserves the species, art
prolongs the individual life as long as it can".32
Malthus had a similar explanation for the mortality rate. But there is no need to
stop at Malthus in seeking predecessors for Risueno d'Amador's view, for the English
30 Broussais, op. cit., note 18 above, p. 44.
31 Bull. Acad. MMd., Paris, 1837, 2: 768.
32 Ibid., p. 804.
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economist restated in another form the attitude towards death of an older, more
familiar tradition. In the eighteenth century many naturalists and students of the life
sciences, including doctors with a penchant for philosophical speculation, adhered to a
form of vitalism which assumed a rigorous balance between the forces of life and
death. As in other debates, this view of nature ceded no ground to mechanical meta-
phors. Above all, the vitalist philosophy tried, often unsuccessfully, to avoid the kind
of reductionism too familiar in mechanical explanations of organic processes. Nor
was the mathematician's method ofstudying the physical world appreciated or valued.
His abstraction from physical realities ignored the individuality so respected and so
necessary to vitalist explanations ofthe relations between natural beings.
Only at the level of the species did the vitalist philosopher agree to the mechanical
and mathematical metaphors. There was a balance, an equality between the forces of
life and death. Human intervention never truly affected this pre-established harmony
which rigorously bound men to a routine imitating the cycle of the seasons. The
optimism of the secular philosophers, their notion of progress, their belief in the
powers of human reason and the perfectibility of human nature - all these were alien
to the sober stoicism ofnatural philosophers who accepted tragedy as a necessary part
of the human condition. Their metaphors, phrased in terms of birth and death,
understood nature as the commencement and gradual fulfilment of a particular
destiny, a special plan or pre-conceived design. Their discussion of the struggle
between the forces of life and death only echoed the mythical combats between good
and evil, a dialectical situation which issued forth in a higher form ofopposition while
never eliminating the tension governing nature's ontogeny.
This world view thoroughly assimilated human relations and their history into a
totally naturalistic system of explanation. Conveniently enough, the vitalist tradition
had denied Cartesian dualism and located human endeavours, whether rational or
otherwise, in the course of nature's history, eliminating any special place or distinct
field for human activity. Consequently, this mode of explanation had no need to
explore the possibility of a science for man. Lacking a well-defined, independent
subject, a genuine science ofman could not exist within the limits ofthis tradition, and
medicine, tied to these assumptions, concentrated on the individual's well-being,
leaving the collectivity to nature's rigorous law. The art of healing, understood in
these terms, was not and could not be a social science.
The 1837 debate closed on a negative note, leaving the opponents and advocates of
numerical methods bickering with each other. Confusion and vendetta, always present
during the debate, were cleared away on only one essential point. Medical statistics,
indispensable for the public hygienist, took its proper place in the vocabulary of
doctors, being distinguished from the numerical method, a procedure that rarely con-
vinced only because therapeutics was so much in need ofappropriate remedies. When
these appeared, the numerical method could convincingly demonstrate their value.
Throughout the sixty years which separated the founding of the Soci'ete Royale de
Medecine from this debate the medical profession tested accepted doctrine with
empirical standards, but never fully submitted to the rules of order governing other
sciences. Some doctors believed this reserve weakened medical science. Others praised
such independence. Despite this divergence, the medical community had matured
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during this formative period. Through intelligent use of its corporate influence, the
profession had safeguarded the country from mesmerism and the democratization of
health care. After these developments the question of who would decide on matters of
medical choice was clear. Only when Louis confronted the profession with his
numerical method did the medical community discuss how competent medical judg-
ments were formed. And here the issue was not the preference of one remedy over
another, for competing treatments left patients equally disarmed against cholera and
other fevers. The central point in this debate revolved around the conception of
medicine and its relation to the other sciences. Its traditional methodology, empirical
and inductive, certainly played a role in the physical sciences, but mathematics, the
corner-stone of modern science, made few inroads into a discipline built on the union
ofanatomy and physiology.
EPILOGUE
The most prominent commentator who later reflected on the application of
mathematics to medicine was Claude Bernard, the vigorous defender ofexperimental
methods in physiology and their extension to medicine. An examination of his
thoughts, which strongly influenced subsequent attitudes, can serve as a useful
epilogue to this discussion, for his essay on experimental medicine recapitulates
earlier theoretical debate on the nature ofmedical knowledge.
First, Bernard considered the nature and limitations of our knowledge of the
physical and biological orders. Distinctly different from the abstract or purely mental
quality of mathematical propositions, knowledge of the natural world measured our
understanding of the conditions which produce specific effects. Unlike the transposi-
tion of our own concepts, the essence of mathematical reasoning, the physical and
biological sciences undertook to uncover the unfailing consistency of nature itself.
Experimentation with the natural order, whether in physics, chemistry, or physiology,
yielded the results which allowed men to determine or foresee the consequences of
particular effects. Concerned in establishing a common ground for all the natural
sciences, Bernard objected to those, like Risueno d'Amador, who would reserve a
special domain for the organic or medical sciences. The notions of life, death, health,
and sickness he considered as antiquated remnants of a pre-scientific mentality.
Physiological functions and their degrees of performance were the only building
blocks of medicine. What mattered, then, was a thorough understanding of the
equilibrium of an organism and the modes of change introduced by pathological or
therapeutic agents. What was important, of course, was to note exactly how a
particular agent modified the functioning of a system. In the absence of this kind of
knowledge, medical science was still insufficient for the doctor's needs. In a word,
Bernard advocated a rigorous understanding ofthe human organism and ofthe condi-
tions ofexistence that perpetuated its stable and regular growth.
A strict determinism was the hallmark of his experimental medicine. For this
reason he minimized the importance of quantitative work, which he felt was pre-
mature, given the limits of medical knowledge. It was more important, he argued, to
study the process of respiration than to quantify the volume of air in the lungs. And
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given thecyclical nature oforganic phenomena, it is wrong to try to conclude anything
significant from the mere taking of averages. Statistical measures were equally
unsatisfying. Knowing that a particular surgical method led to a mortality of2/5 sig-
nified "absolutely nothing scientifically and provides no certain basis for a new opera-
tion, for you do not know if this new case will be among the cured or among the
dead". Bernard's approach was much more fruitful: "Instead ofempirically collecting
facts, study them ... in their special determinism. It is necessary to examine the fatal
cases with great care, trying to discover the cause of mortal accidents .... So that, if
you know the exact cause of success or failure, you will always be able to succeed in
any particular cases .... Only then will you have attained scientific determinism. But
you will never achieve this with the aid ofstatistics, for statistics have never taught nor
will they ever teach us anything about the nature ofphenomena". Nor will they tell the
physician how to treat a particular case."
In his conclusions, Bernard stood back from the long and quarrelsome debate over
the applicability ofmathematics to medicine to reflect on the possibilities for progress
in the medical sciences. Early proponents of the application of statistical methods to
medical practice had argued that the Enlightenment ideology of empirical study and
objective standards had to penetrate medical science before it could reach maturity. In
their absence, practitioners could always rely on traditional remedies ofquestionable
value, defending their choice by appeal to some higher sensitivity or gifted intuition.
Quarrels between defenders of rival practices could never be settled unless an unam-
biguous test could decide the question. While these arguments, framed in terms of a
scientific age, persuaded some, many physicians were reluctant to credit statistical
data with real significance. Claude Bernard was among them, but his objections
carried in them a clear defence ofscientific determinism, the only firm grounding for
medical science. Statistics, he argued, could suggest a probable outcome but never a
certitude, and in specific cases certitude or absolute determination was precisely what
the physician needed. Otherwise medicine would remain a conjectural art and the
doctor an artist who responds to the indeterminism of particular cases with his own
genius or medical tact. In his view, those who defended statistics as the basis for
medical decision-making actually weakened the scientific tenor of those decisions,
giving free play to the imagination ofpractitioners.34 The problem, ofcourse, was not
the exclusion of statistics from medical science, but theirjudicious use as a research
tool. In the end the debate over the place ofmathematics in medicine served as a focal
point for discussion of the relation of medical knowledge to the epistemological
standards of the other sciences, and, above all, to measure the utility of new techni-
ques against thehumanist concerns ofthe practitioners.
SUMMARY
In the early nineteenth century a persuasive and varied group of physicians urged
the profession to consider the utility ofnumerical methods for medical practice. They
33Claude Bernard, Introduction a 1'tude de la mi'decine experimentale, Paris, Flammarion, 1952,
p. 192.
34 Ibid., pp. 191-196.
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were convinced that medical knowledge would rest on firmer foundations if
practitioners employed methods that had served the physical sciences so well. Echoing
Condorcet's hopeful but perhaps illusory aim, some doctors believed that questions of
human judgment, whether social or medical, could ultimately be decided through
analytic procedures which would convince rational men oftheir validity and veracity.
This position affirmed that an unambiguous numerical method could decide questions
of therapeutic choice. More modest proposals, less threatening to the traditional
perception of the doctor's unique role in the medical act, restricted the application of
numerical techniques to epidemiology. Yet even here the extensive use of the
methodology fortified a more intense concern for questions related to the public's
health and, by extension, tended to de-emphasize accepted views of the physician's
concern for individual patients. Opposition came from diverse sectors of the profes-
sion. Many articulate physicians contested the claims for objectivity advanced by the
advocates of numerical methods. In fact, a strong empirical tendency fortified critics
who argued against generalization based on a precise number of cases. The variety
and complexity of the human subject defied any movement towards uniform treat-
ment ofthe sick, who ultimately could only receive adequate aid from the talented and
perceptive physician. In the 1830s rivals clashed in the Academy of Medicine and in
the Academy of Sciences. Both debates provided ample testimony to the divisions in
professional opinion concerning the appropriate methodology for evaluating medical
judgments. Later, Claude Bernard advanced an explicit objection to statistical
methods which, in his view, only deterred the physician from the search for the specific
cause of a particular effect. Strict determinism alone could provide the kind of
certitude that medical science required. The many-sided debate focused attention on
the methods and objectives ofmedicine and promoted further reflection on the access
to useful knowledge at a time when the profession confronted medical and social
problems which defied easy solution.
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